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Abstract 
In	this	paper,	we	respond	to	the	recent	paper	in	the	Journal	of	Management	by	Becker,	
Cropanzano,	and	Sanfey	(2011)	entitled	Organizational	Neuroscience:	Taking	
Organizational	Theory	Inside	the	Neural	Black	Box.	More	specifically,	we	build	on	the	ideas	
of	Becker	et	al.	(2011),	to	first	clarify	and	extend	their	work,	and	then	to	explore	the	critical	
philosophical	issues	involved	in	drawing	inferences	from	neuroscientific	research.	We	
argue	that	these	problems	are	yet	to	be	solved,	and	organizational	researchers	who	wish	to	
incorporate	neuroscientific	advances	into	their	work	need	to	engage	with	them.	 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 THE DOMAIN OF ORGANIZATIONAL COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CHALLENGES 
 
For almost a decade, a small but growing body of researchers has sought to address a singular 
research question, with implications for management scholars across the globe; namely, what 
benefit can an understanding of the human brain have for the science and practice of 
management? As research in this area has progressed it has become more and more obvious that 
robust answers to this question need the input of a wide panel of experts from across both 
organizational science and mainstream cognitive neuroscience. Neither field alone possesses the 
theoretical, methodological, or practical tools necessary to fully address the scientific problems 
at hand. Thus we were delighted to see the recent paper in the Journal of Management by 
Becker, Cropanzano, and Sanfey (2011) entitled Organizational Neuroscience: Taking 
Organizational Theory Inside the Neural Black Box. We strongly share Becker et al.’s (2011) 
sense of excitement about the potential for neuroscientific advances to inform major advances in 
organizational sciences, while also recognizing that even well-established cognitive science can 
offer major insight into current organizational theory. In fact, we would go further than Becker et 
al. (2011), to argue that without the appropriate application of cognitive neuroscience, 
organizational science will find it far more difficult to advance at the same rapid rate that it has 
over the last century. Similarly, we consider that the ecological validity offered by organizational 
research settings is necessary for cognitive neuroscience itself to move forward at a similarly 
rapid rate (Lee, Senior, and Butler, 2011). 
 The present paper is partly expository, and partly theoretical. As such, our first purpose is 
to build on the ideas of Becker et al. (2011), and provide what we consider a number of 
important clarifications and extensions to their excellent piece. However, we also move beyond 
such exposition to grapple with a number of critical philosophical problems that need serious 
consideration by any researcher interested in drawing inferences from neuroscientific research. 
These problems are yet to be solved, and cut to the very heart of neuroscience itself. As such, 
organizational researchers who wish to investigate the potential of neuroscience to inform their 
work need to engage with these inference problems, in order to avoid the nonsensical claims that 
seem to appear with such frequency in the popular press (e.g. Lindstrom, 2011). 
First we outline our theoretical position, and clarify the position, role, and definition of 
what we have termed the organizational cognitive neuroscience approach (e.g. Lee and 
Chamberlain, 2007; Butler and Senior, 2007a; Lee, Senior, and Butler, 2011; Senior, Lee, and 
Butler, 2011), a specialized variant of social cognitive neuroscience (e.g. Lieberman, 2006). We 
show that Becker et al.’s (2011) organizational neuroscience framework is an essential 
component to a wider understanding of organizational and social cognitive neuroscience. Yet at 
the core of each of these approaches lies a singular common truth; for behavior and any form of 
activity in the brain to be related, that behavior must have played a beneficial role in our 
evolutionary development. That is, the behavior must be adaptive (see e.g., Nicholson, 2010), 
because of the huge evolutionary cost of developing specialized brain structures. While it is 
outside our present scope to provide full details of this process, Lee et al. (2011) have discussed 
the potential contribution of Edelman’s neural Darwinism model as one possible mechanism by 
which behavior can moderate cortical architecture. 
 Following the theoretical discussion, we detail the limitations that scientists working 
within such frameworks face. These are particularly worrying when considered in concert with 
the technological limitations of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which appears to 
be the method of choice for cognitive neuroscience research at present (Bandettini, 2007). We 
will see that a fundamental limitation in neuroimaging is an inability to infer complex social 
behavior from observations of specific activated brain regions. While mainstream cognitive 
neuroscientific research has started to address the various limitations of neuroimaging (see e.g., 
Vul, Harris, Winkelman & Pashler, 2009), there remains considerable philosophical and 
empirical interest in the issues (e.g. Klien, 2010). Thus, the time is most certainly right for those 
interested in applying cognitive neuroscience to management research to embrace this debate. 
 Finally, we will discuss the possible benefits that the organizational cognitive 
neuroscientific approach specifically can contribute to our understanding of managerial practice 
and human cognition in general. Here we will discuss a philosophical conjecture known as the 
forward inference approach. We will detail how only when combined with organizational 
cognitive neuroscience can forward inference approaches provide insights and benefits to 
managerial science and practice.  
Organizational Neuroscience and Organizational Cognitive Neuroscience 
To ensure that the management scholar is aware of the distinct approaches available it is 
important to discuss the differences and similarities in the various theoretical positions. 
However, it must be understood that a comparative discussion of Becker et al.’s (2011) 
organizational neuroscience (ON), social cognitive neuroscience (SCN e.g. Blakemore et al, 
2004), and organizational cognitive neuroscience (OCN e.g. Senior et al. 2011) should not be 
understood as merely semantic, nor as simply neologistic fetishism. We do not see these 
frameworks as mutually exclusive, competing paradigms of which only one can emerge 
victorious (cf. Kuhn, 1970). Rather, organizational cognitive neuroscience is symbiotic with 
organizational neuroscience as described in Becker et al. (2011), as well as its older cousin social 
cognitive neuroscience, to form a detailed theoretical framework that helps scholars to 
understand the complexities of the social behavior that occurs within organizations. 
The simplest way to begin comparative discussion is to consider ON, OCN, and SCN in 
light of the distance from the brain where each perspective takes up its primary vantage point. 
For example, drawing from Becker et al. (2011), ON appears to be a fundamentally 
neuroanatomical perspective, in that it is concerned with the role that brain anatomy plays in the 
mediation of organizational decisions. Becker et al. (2011, p. 934) exemplify this perspective – 
even the title refers to the ‘neural black box’ – early in the paper, with comments such as “our 
interest lies in understanding the brain processes behind observed attitudes and behaviors … 
prior organizational theories are incomplete in the sense that they do not consider the most 
fundamental level of analysis.”  Throughout the paper, statements around the remit of ON 
support the neuroanatomical/physiological focus, such as “each neuron operates in the same way, 
and all brains are organized in a similar fashion”, and in particular with the discussion of ON as a 
distinct level of analysis, concerning “levels of reduction that deconstruct individuals to discrete 
brain processes”, involving “neural mechanisms” and “molecular explanations” (p. 936-937). 
Here, the primary focus is clearly the brain’s physical substrates, and connections between them, 
with Becker et al.’s (2011, p. 934 emphasis added) stated aim for ON to “understand and 
incorporate the cognitive machinery behind our thoughts and actions into organizational theory”  
Further, Becker et al. (2011) give a number of examples of ON, all of which concern the 
functional specificity of certain substrates in the mediation of organizationally-relevant behavior, 
such as the discussions of mirror neurons, emotional contagion, implicit attitudes and so forth. 
Becker et al.’s (2011) ON approach can therefore be seen as the fundamental foundation for both 
social and organizational cognitive neuroscience.  
Moving from an anatomical perspective to a cognitive (brain function) perspective, SCN 
focuses on how biological systems mediate social cognition and behavior, while OCN examines 
social cognition and behavior within the workplace (see Butler et al, 2007a,b; Decety & Keenan, 
2006). Here, the emphasis of both approaches is on the plurality of techniques that converge on a 
further understanding of social behavior. Given that work is a form of species-specific social 
behavior, it has previously been argued that social behavior in the workplace should be 
considered separately from the wider social cognitive neuroscience approach (e.g. Senior et al., 
2008; 2011). That said, it is important to acknowledge that OCN and SCN are emergent fields, 
and that topics of study can be often intertwined rather than exclusive. Certainly, there is 
considerable overlap between the two fields (cf. Blakemore et al., 2004) 
In the OCN approach, the management scholar is interested in understanding how the 
biological systems as a whole (rather than solely the activation of specific brain regions) operate 
to mediate social processes. Thus, the main differences between ON and OCN/SCN occur at the 
level of analysis. Specifically, ON as presented in Becker et al. (2011), is conceptualized as a 
distinct level of analysis, concerning the understanding of the neural mechanisms behind 
organizational behaviors, and thus appears to focus on the process at a cellular/physiological 
level. However, OCN is conceptualized as a perspective that incorporates multiple levels of 
analysis, as does SCN. Drawing from Senior et al. (2011) OCN is interested not only in the 
structures and systems within the brain of relevance to organizational behavior, but also the 
interaction between those biological systems and cognition itself. Of course, there are certain 
overlaps. In particular, to gain a complete understanding of the moderating role of biological 
systems in the workplace (i.e. the goal of OCN/SCN), one must have an understanding of the 
brain’s functional architecture (the ON perspective). However, all of the various approaches face 
a fundamental question that is addressed next. 
Neuroscientific Methodology and the Pure Insertion Hypothesis: What do Brain Scans 
Really Tell Us? 
An important aspect of understanding the appropriate conclusions that can be drawn from 
functional neuroimaging data is a clear understanding of the typical experimental procedure. In 
the simplest sense, a brain imaging experiment involves what is known as subtractive 
methodology. In other words, brain activation caused by a particular experimental factor is 
subtracted from the activity that is present during a control state. For example, in a study 
regarding the perception of angry facial expressions, one would show examples of these affects 
and subtract any engendered activation from activity revealed on presentation of faces showing 
no affect. The computation of the subtractive response is the first stage of the statistical process 
that ultimately leads to a test of the experimental hypothesis. However at its core the basic 
subtractive approach implies the common-sense conclusion that if region X is active during task 
A (e.g. looking at angry faces) when compared to task B, then region X must be involved in the 
performance of task A. However, contrary to popular belief, this is not the case. 
 Rather than ‘proving’ that brain region X is associated with task A, the colorful imagery 
that is often presented with the findings of brain imaging studies merely indicates the level of 
confidence that we have with regards to whether the particular region of the brain is somehow 
implicated in the task. Simply put, with the data we have in such cases, it is impossible to infer a 
lack of involvement in a region which is not shown as activated. To make such an inference 
invokes the pure insertion hypothesis, which claims that engendered activity specific to a 
particular task remains unchanged when we add other tasks. For the subtractive approach 
discussed above to work properly as a test of whether region X is associated with task A, the pure 
insertion hypothesis must be true. However as has been shown previously, this is far from 
guaranteed, and may be impossible to prove (e.g. Price & Friston, 1996).  
 Violation of the pure insertion hypothesis shows us that the traditional subtractive 
approach has limitations to its ability to help us fully understand the inherent complexities of the 
cognitive system. Brain regions may indeed be functionally specialized – i.e., that region X is 
specialized to perform a specific task – however such regions also need to interact in a 
hierarchical and dynamic fashion (Friston, 2000). Much existing work has already shown that the 
extent of this interaction is vast, with a number of regions throughout the entire brain operating 
together in a hierarchical fashion for both single, commonplace processes such as face 
perception, and for more complex processes such as social reward (Longe et al, 2009: Foley et 
al, 2011). Indeed, the advent of multivoxel pattern analysis as an analytic strategy that addresses 
patterns of activity, compared to identifying specific regions of activation, is an important 
development within cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Norman, Plyn, Detre & Haxby, 2006).  
A further limitation of the subtractive experimental approach concerns the interpretation 
of quantitative differences in the data. It is fundamentally impossible to infer the functional 
importance of a defined region X by comparing the relative differences in the activation of X 
across tasks A and B (Nair, 2005; Logothetis, 2008). In short, while we already argued that a 
greater degree of activity for task A doesn’t necessarily mean that region X is correspondingly 
responsible for that task, it is also the case that the amount of activity detected in X does not 
necessarily directly correspond to how important region X is for that task. 
 Given the issues outlined above, and notwithstanding the popularity of fMRI specifically, 
which is such that one may be forgiven for assuming that fMRI is the only method available to 
the cognitive neuroscientist, it seems relevant to wonder what in fact neuroimgaging is able to 
teach us, and why it is so popular. Of course, answers to such musings are complex and readers 
should be under no illusions that methods such as fMRI have in the last 20 years revolutionized 
our understanding of human cognition. However to assure the continuation of this revolution into 
the organizational sciences, it is vital that organizational researchers understand a number of 
philosophical issues concerning inference (cf. Poldrack, 2011), before they begin designing, 
conducting, and reporting studies based on cognitive neuroscience methods. It is particularly 
important to stress that the simple application of organizational contexts to neuroimaging work is 
unable to by itself solve any of these issues. Rather, the challenge is for organizational 
researchers to become cognizant of the inherent challenges in this area, before designing research 
programs. 
Forward and Reverse Inference 
In the context of functional neuroimaging (regardless of specific modality), forward inference 
refers to an analytical approach that – rather than simply look for activation in a particular region 
of the brain – uses patterns of brain activation to distinguish between competing cognitive 
theories. The now-classic example of this particular approach is given by Henson (2006) who 
combined aspects of the subtractive approach discussed above with a forward inference 
framework to demonstrate a distinction in the dual-process theory of recognition memory. 
Henson’s demonstration showed that there were differences in the pattern of brain activation for 
two different types of recognition memory that ostensibly occurred within the same regions, thus 
showing us that there must have been a distinction in the cognitive processes that underpin the 
differences that were examined. 
For the management scholar, such a demonstration may seem so obvious as to be 
redundant. It is indeed common-sense to assume that differences in a particular cognitive task 
would indeed imply differences in the underlying cortical signature. However it may be 
surprising to note that such an approach is not often the case within mainstream cognitive 
neuroscience. Indeed in the latter case it is more common to use the reverse inference model 
(Poldrack, 2006). When making a reverse inference, the cognitive neuroscientist would 
effectively use a measure of engendered cortical activation to infer that a particular region of the 
brain is involved in a particular task. Take for example, the early work on face perception (as one 
example of an adaptive social skill) that revealed a ‘dedicated’ region in the ventral surface of 
the cortex to be implicated in its perception (Kanwisher et al, 1997). Thus, in the reverse 
inference model, the activation is used as evidence that region X is associated with the task. 
Again, at a superficial level this seems to be a fairly straightforward approach. Certainly, 
this particular approach is enjoying a resurgence, with the rise of applied neuroscience research 
in fields such as economics or moral psychology, where the underlying cognitive process, or 
specific region that mediates a particular process, is considered to be unknown (e.g., Greene et 
al., 2011). Of course, OCN is very much a member of this newer research fraternity, and as such 
one would assume that reverse inference would be an ideal means by which we can understand 
more about cognition in the workplace. However, there are a number of limitations attached to 
the reverse inference approach that, if reverse inference is used alone, we feel render it broadly 
untenable for OCN. 
 The most fundamental issue is that the reverse inference approach “reflects the logical 
fallacy of affirming the consequent” (Poldrack, 2008, p. 223). In other words, it is impossible to 
be confident in the assignment of a particular cognitive task A to a particular active region of the 
brain X, outside of the possibility that other processes may have also contributed to activation of 
region X during task A. Indeed, Poldrack (2008) formulated the ‘reverse inference paradox’, 
which suggests that the more complex a cognitive task, the less chance there is of identifying a 
discrete cortical response. Given the complexity of the social behaviors faced by the 
management scholar, it is likely that this limiting factor will play a significant role in deciding 
which approach to adopt (see e.g., Senior, Lee & Butler, 2011 for a further discussion). Rather, 
we argue that for the application of neuroimaging techniques to flourish within the 
organizational cognitive neuroscientist’s repertoire, the forward inference approach would also 
need to be adopted. It should be noted that mainstream cognitive neuroscientists are starting to 
move further away from the limitations of the reverse inference paradigm with the 
developmental of analytic strategies that examine the patterns of engendered activity across 
entire volume of interest with approaches such as multivoxel pattern analysis (e.g., Haxby, 
Gobbini, Furey, Ishai, Schouten & Pietrini, 2001). Such an approach has already started to 
provide radical insights into the workings of the human brain (Chiu, 2010) and will likely 
provide more in the years to come. Further, we argue that, with the use of the forward inference 
approach, OCN has a unique opportunity to provide us with fundamental insights about human 
cognition. 
 Of course, we do not wish to imply that the reverse inference approach is completely 
without merit. Indeed there are a number of significant reports that have employed this paradigm 
to reveal much about our cognitive system. Rather we would subscribe to Kosslyn’s (1999) 
caveats, and maintain that the revelation that a specific brain area is activated in association with 
a specific task should only be taken to mean that this area is probably involved in some way 
(although this level of involvement could be very minor or even incidental to the main issue at 
hand). It can therefore be targeted in subsequent experimental endeavors to provide a convergent 
portfolio of evidence as to the necessity of that region.  
Taking this in hand, the reverse inference approach can be used to identify the so-called 
cognitive domain of specific regions in the human brain (Christoff & Owen, 2006). For example, 
while a region in the ventral cortex is seen to be implicated in face perception, we cannot say that 
it is the region specifically and solely responsible for the perception of faces. However, it can be 
argued that the area does have a specific cognitive domain (i.e. faces) that overlaps with other 
areas. Again considering the inherent complexity of workplace behaviors, the reverse inference 
approach can be used to identify regions that are defined by high degrees of cognitive 
complexity, such as regions of the prefrontal cortex (Christoff & Gabrielli, 2000). However, we 
cannot then make the inference that these regions are those solely involved in behaviors such as 
effective leadership. Rather, by taking such findings a stage further and applying a forward 
inference approach, it may be possible to start to identify management traits which may 
differentially involve such regions. Such a multilevel approach has already been advocated in the 
cognate disciplines, which may help address these inferential problems (Yarkoni et al, 2011).  
Adaptive Behaviors in the Workplace 
As seen above, combining forward and reverse inference paradigms has strong potential to 
advance management science. However, when this combined perspective is mated with an 
acceptance of the evolved/adaptive nature of human behavior, management research can reap 
even greater benefits. To take but one example, there is a school of thought in the mainstream 
management sciences that urges organizations to reconfigure themselves to ensure that they 
facilitate behavior within their workers that is parsimonious with their evolutionary past (see e.g. 
Nicholson, 1998). In such research, it is argued that that the natural social processes that we are 
predisposed to favor – such as friendliness, social interaction and emotion-based decision 
making – should be encouraged in the workplace, to facilitate a more natural way of managing 
and working. To many this is hardly contentious; one only has to imagine the idiosyncratic 
organizational culture in companies like Google, IDEO, or Blizzard, to see how aligning the 
workspace with the nature of employees can facilitate high quality output in certain cases (e.g., 
Coy, 2006; Gallo, 2006). Yet at a more fundamental level it is also possible to identify core 
social processes within our evolutionary past, that are at the heart of contemporary theories of 
effective management. 
 Take for example, the notion of transformational leadership, which is regarded as being a 
more socially aligned mode of leadership when compared to transactional leadership (Judge & 
Piccolo, 2004). Here, it is said that effective leaders can identify a particular work situation and 
employ various inspirational and challenging strategies to motivate workers to achieve various 
goals. The components of transformational leadership are well described elsewhere (see e.g. 
Avolio, Bass & Jung, 1999). What is of more importance for our purposes is the recent finding 
that these traits enjoy parsimony with our evolutionary past at both a physiological and 
neurophysiological level (Senior et al, 2011b,c; Lee et al, 2011). 
From a behavioral perspective however, the identification of such adaptive traits is not as 
clear cut, and management scholars regularly face difficulty with their identification across 
various situations. Take for example the possibility that an effective leader may motivate the 
work force but do little to inspire, and vice versa. Here we face a question regarding how best to 
identify the effective traits that have an adaptive value. According to evolutionary theorists, 
transformational traits such as the ability to inspire a group would be favored by natural selection 
over the ability to motivate (Van Vugt & Schaller, 2008; Van Vugt et al, 2008).Yet, given that 
the ability to both inspire and motivate are intertwined at the behavioral level they are often 
impossible to separate. However, if the specific adaptive trait could be identified it would then be 
theoretically possible to fashion management practices around it. Such application would 
ultimately lead to the ‘natural’ way of management that Nicholson (Nicholson, 2010), and others 
(Whitty, 2011), previously describe.  
The above discussion provides further evidence that there is limited utility in the reverse 
inference model for organizational cognitive neuroscience. Merely asking managers to engage in 
a series of tasks designed to evoke inspirational or motivational behavior when situated in a brain 
scanner would obviously a) engender activity in a range of overlapping cortical areas, and b) the 
activated regions will possibly start to exhibit differential activity when the participants are asked 
to make inspirational versus motivational leadership decisions. Unfortunately, as shown above 
this does not provide any real evidence that region X is specifically involved with a particular 
type of leadership. In fact, the need to identify whether or not a particular region of the brain is 
activated during a particular task has yet to be convincingly proved, as already discussed. 
Perhaps more crucially it tells us nothing about whether or not a specific process has any form of 
value from an evolutionary standpoint.  
Of course, as we have made clear throughout this commentary the dichotomy implied by 
the notions of reverse and forward inference is not strictly correct. As Klein (2010, p. 188) notes 
‘the two process are often intertwined in practice’. Indeed, when used in the context of multiple 
or even competing cognitive theories of organizational processes, the utility of a combined 
forward/reverse inference model in helping to understand the inherent complexity of 
management behavior is far more certain. By interpreting the complex patterns of cortical 
activity that are revealed for both types of tasks, and identifying differences in such activity, it 
may indeed be possible to identify the process that has enjoyed the evolutionary benefit and the 
process that would be of real relevance to the manager. However, a priori predictions must be 
made from theory, rather than simply placing managers in brain scanners and trying to post hoc 
interpret their brain activity. It is worth bearing in mind that the above notion of embedded 
cognition is firmly established in the cognitive science literature, and scholars have used this 
approach to help understand a variety of problems that arise from fields as diverse as artificial 
intelligence and psychiatry. However, it has yet to explored within the management sciences 
(Anderson, 2006; Waters, Rock, Dragovic & Jablensky, 2011). 
Thus, here we present an empirical challenge for the community at large. It is yet to be 
seen whether or not an analysis of the patterns of cortical activity can be used to differentiate 
between various management traits, and if so whether such traits lead to effective behavior in the 
workplace. Although, we are certain that such research could result in extremely impressive 
brain scan images, which may or may not be of interest to the popular press – whatever their 
scientific usefulness. Rather, we believe that for OCN to thrive, studies that have a distinct 
forward inference component to their design are needed. This is one way in which we can start to 
make inroads into identifying the core traits that constitute effective behavior in the workplace.  
Concluding Remarks 
The perspective we offer here should be read in parallel with the approach argued by Becker et 
al. (2011) – they are complementary. The application of neuroscience to management is a 
nascent field but one that promises to enrich our fundamental understanding about our working 
lives. In that context, it is vital to engage in progressive, and informed, debates about theory, 
method and applications to practice. 
We have carefully drawn a theoretical distinction between OCN and ON, suggesting that 
the presentation of ON in Becker et al. (2011) is as a single, distinct level of analysis, 
concentrating its interest on processes at a neurobiological level. This level is a subset of the 
overarching OCN research agenda as presented in Senior et al. (2011), which itself focuses on 
social processes within the workplace and is thus a specialized application of SCN (Lieberman, 
2006). Nevertheless, both OCN and ON (as well as cognitive neuroscience itself) share 
methodological concerns regarding the interpretation of data from brain scans, and the role of 
inference. By exploring adaptive behaviors in the workplace, using the specific example of 
transformational leadership, we propose that a multilevel approach is used to help resolve these 
inference problems. In particular, a combined forward/reverse inference model will help to 
identify cortical activity, the context of that activity and potentially the influence of evolutionary 
psychology on workplace behavior. 
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